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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARDY SEURING, a minor by and 
through his guardian ad litem 
GERDA SEURING, 
Plaitntiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS COOK, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 10027 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was filed in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District at the instance of the plaintiff 
but with the prior consent and concurrence of the de-
fendant in order to insure to the plaintiff his right to 
support until he reaches the age of majority in accord-
ance with the duty imposed upon the defendant by the 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support A·ct, as appears in 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 78-45-3, which states 
simply: 
"EYery man shall support his wife and his child." 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On February 10, 1964, the time set for hearing on 
an Order to Show Cause directed to the defendant to 
show cause why judgment for the support arrearages 
and an order for continuing support should not be enter-
ed, the Court, acting upon the oral motion of defendant's 
counsel, made in open Court without prior notice, at 
the time and place of the hearing on said Order to Show 
Cause, expressed its indignation over the fact that the 
plaintiff's counsel had prepared the ''Answer'' the de-
fendant signed, expressed the opinion that such a prac-
tice was "inimical to advisary proceedings prescribed 
by our system of justice," refused to take evidence or 
argument on the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, and 
summarily ordered the plaintiff's Complaint dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have his Complaint and ac-
tion reinstated, judgment entered for the support ar-
rearages accruing since October 19, 1962, at the rate of 
$20.00 per month, and a continuing order of support 
entered against the defendant, together with his costs 
incurred in the original action and the costs of this ap-
peal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Hardy Seuring, is a male infant, born 
October 19, 1962, in Moenchengladbach, Germany. His 
mother is Gerda Seuring. The defendant, Dennis Cook, 
a resident of the State of Utah, was stationed with the 
American Military forces in Germany during part of 
1961 and 1962. Gerda Seuring, a resident of Moen-
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chengladbach, Germany, then a girl 18 years of age 
(born June 9, 1943) claims to have become acquainted 
with the defendant, Dennis Cook, a sergeant in the 
United States Army, in November of 1961, in Wild-
flecken, Germany, and to have become engaged to him 
on the 27th day of December, 1961. A wedding date of 
February 15, 1962, was agreed upon, but the marriage 
never took place because of the opposition of the par-
ents of Gerda Seuring to her proposed marriage to the 
defendant. Gerda Seuring claims that during the period 
of her engagement, that she with defendant, Dennis 
Cook, had her first and until after the birth of her child, 
Hardy Seuring, her only sexual contact and that as a 
result thereof she conceived and later gave birth to the 
minor plaintiff. (She is now married.) 
Counsel for the plaintiff is also the Consul for the 
Federal Republic of Germany for the State of Utah. The 
matter was referred to his office for the purpose of ob-
taining from the defendant an acknowledgment of his 
paternity and some sort of a confession of judgment or 
liability which could be used to enforce by judicial pro-
ceedings the defendant's obligation to support the child, 
Hardy Seuring. The initial contact with the defendant 
made by letter dated February 2, 1963·, the full contents 
of which are set forth as follows: 
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Box 444 
Kaysville, Utah 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
4 
February 2, 1963 
The German Consulate General in San Francisco, 
California, has forwarded today to this office your files 
for further processing. 
According to information contained in this file, it 
appears that Gerda Seuring has named you as the father 
of her minor child, Hardy Seuring, born October 19, 1962. 
It is the desire of this office to effect a peaceful re-
conciliation with you. It will be required that you pro-
vide a monthly payment for the support of your minor 
child. It is our desire to do this without necessity of 
bringing a court action, if possible. 
It is very urgent that you contact this office and 
arrange an appointment with me to discuss this matter. 
If we fail to hear from you within 10 days from the date 
hereof, we shall proceed to file our action in pursuance 
of the provisions of title 78, chapter 45, paragraphs 3, 
4, and 5 of Utah Code Annotated 1953, to obtain an order 
of the court against you according to the law in such 
cases made and provided. 
JED:ah 
Very truly yours, 
John Elwood Dennett 
cc: German Consulate, Dr. Harald Michelsen 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
According to the affidavit and testimony of the de-
fendant, Dennis Cook, and his wife, Sharon Cook, one 
of them called the office of the plaintiff's counsel by 
long distance from Syracuse, Utah, and arranged with 
the receptionist for an appointment for the morning of 
February 18, 1963. The receptionist apparently failed 
to inform plaintiff's counsel of the appointment so that 
the appearance of the defendant and his wife in the of-
fice of the plaintiff's counsel of February 18, 1963, be-
tween 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. was somewhat of a 
surprise. 
The defendant confessed freely to his paternity and 
offered an explanation for what had happened and his 
regret that Gerda's parents had opposed their marriage. 
He wanted to discharge his moral and legal obligation 
and was willing to sign any papers necessary for that 
purpose. His chief concern was the avoidance of any 
unfavorable publicity or the payment of attorney's fees. 
He stated that he always had been willing, ready, 
and able to marry Gerda Seuring, but because of the 
parental opposition aforesaid, the same never took place. 
There was a complete absence of any hostility or adverse 
feelings throughout the conversation of the plaintiff's 
counsel, the defendant, and the defendant's wife. Even 
upon admitting freely to the paternity of the child the 
defendant's wife seemed to be sympathetic and under-
standing. 
Plaintiff's counsel immediately dispatched a secre-
tary to prepare the necessary papers for the defendant 
to sign, namely a complaint, a petition for guardian ad 
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litem and a confession of liability in the form of an 
answer. 
Although the volume of typing was considerable, 
this turned out to be a relatively easy task. A number of 
previous cases similar to this had been processed through 
this same law office and preparing papers for the de-
fendant in this action to sign was simply a matter of 
changing a few names and dates in an old file and then 
copying. The usual type of document executed on such 
an occasion is a simple confession of judgement. How-
ever, in this case such a document was fraught with 
complications due to two or three important facts. 
1. The plaintiff's counsel, while being familiar 
with the confession as a device for confession of 
judgment for a liquidated amount or a fixed sum, 
had never used or seen the device employed for 
the purpose of establishing a judgement for a con-
tinuing support obligation. 
2. Since the principal plaintiff in this action 
was a minor, the legal question arose as to wheth-
er a judgment could be confessed in favor of a 
minor for whom a guardian ad litem had not 
been appointed. 
Rather than risk any loop holes that might ensue by 
the attempted use of the confession of judgment to estab-
lish a continuing liability of support and because no 
guardian ad litem had been appointed at the time the 
defendant was willing to sign a confession of judgment, 
it was decided to make some sort of an adaptation of 
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device used frequently in a divorce proceedings called 
an appearance and waiver. This, too, had its complica-
tions inasmuch as the petition for guardian ad litem had 
to be dispatched to Germany for signature before the 
complaint and hence, the answer could be filed. Also, 
the risk was present that the defendant, in signing a 
simple blanket admission might later claim to have in-
tended to admit facts other than those that actually were 
stated in the complaint that was later filed. For this 
reason, it was thought advisable that the answer instead 
of admitting certain numbered paragraphs of a proposed 
plaintiff's complaint, should in addition thereto set forth 
completely in the answer all facts which the defendant 
was specifically admitting. 
While the documents were being prepared, a task 
which took nearly an hour, the plaintiff's counsel, the 
defendant, and the defendant's wife engaged in pleas-
antries, small talk and jovial banter for the purpose of 
killing time for the ensuing 30-45 minutes waiting pe-
riod while the documents were being typed and to allevi-
ate the boredom of waiting. Because of the friendly and 
co-operative attitude, the conversation covered various 
areas of German geography, philosophy, religion, mor-
ality, personal and similar experiences, etc. Some of 
the stiff formality ordinarily accompanying proceedings 
such as this was dropped due to the attitude displayed 
by the defendant and his wife. 
The conversation drifted to other cases similar to 
this one including several paternity cases which had 
ended either in the subsequent marriage of the father 
and the mother or the establishment of a home and a 
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place to rear the child. Since marriage was out of the 
question as far as the defendant in this case was con-
cerned because the defendant had married in the mean-
time, the possibility of adopting the child was discussed. 
This was a favorite subject of plaintiff's counsel, since 
plaintiff's counsel himself has experienced the happiness 
of an adoption, a fact that was freely disclosed to the 
defendant and his wife at the time of this discussion. 
(Although this disclosure has been the source of some 
regret now that it becomes apparent how intimate in-
formation of this sort can be twisted and misused.) 
{The possibility of adopting the child by the defend-
ant and his wife was complicated by the fact that the 
infant child had lived more than three months with its 
natural mother and it would not be easy to separate 
him from her to be reared in the home of the father in 
a strange land and by a step-mother.) There was the 
further problem of finances. The defendant complained 
of seasonal unemployment and inquired as to the cost 
of an adoption proceeding. He was informed that the 
cost of air transportation for either having the baby 
brought here and the escort returned or the father going 
from here and bring the child back would be about 
$2,000.00. An inquiry was also made regarding visas, 
affidavits of support, and the like for bringing the child 
into the United States if the natural mother would con-
sent to such an arrangement. The defendant was ad-
vised that the plaintiff's counsel would be more than 
willing to help with translations, letters in the German 
language, affidavits, visas, passports, and the like at no 
cost to the defendant. The defendant was not fluent in 
German and plaintiff's counsel was willing to be helpful. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
After discussing the aforestated legal problems in 
accepting a simple confession of judgment, it was ex-
plained that neither the complaint nor the petition for 
appointment of guardian ad litem could be filed with the 
court until the same had been dispatched to Germany, 
signed, and returned. If the defendant wanted to sign 
the appearance and waiver and confession of liability in 
the form of a very detailed answer at this time, the same 
would have to be held in file until such time as the com-
plaint had been verified and the petition for guardian ad 
litem had been returned from Germany for filing. 
The proposed complaint was then jointly read in de-
tail aloud by the plaintiff's counsel to the defendant (it 
being a very short complaint consisting of only six para-
graphs each having three or four lines.) Then the answer, 
which repeats nearly word for word the allegations of 
the complaint was also read. The petition for appoint-
ment for guardian ad litem was mentioned, but not read. 
An explanation was offered that this was a document 
on the basis of which the court could appoint a person of 
the age of maturity to represent the interest of the minor. 
The defendant agreed that the answer could be held 
and filed together with the complaint as soon as the com-
plaint and petition were returned from Germany. 
Before signing the answer, the defendant asked if 
he would have to pay support money to the plaintiff's 
mother if the proposed adoption proceedings were suc-
cessful. He was informed that the child would only be 
entitled to be suported once and that if he was living 
with and receiving support from the father that there 
would be no duty on the part of the father to pay the 
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mother any sum of money for the support of the child. 
The answer was then signed. To insure against any 
possible slip-ups, the defendant was asked to initial the 
first page of the answer, which he filed, as well as to sign 
the second page thereof. 
The papers were then dispatched to Germany, later 
returned and finally filed. 
In response to the defendant's chief and only ex-
pressed concern that he would not be burdened with at-
torney's fees and court costs in addition to his obligation 
for support for the child, the plaintiff's counstl- assured 
the defendant that the defendant would have to pay no 
attorney's fees connected with this proceedings and that 
beyond the obligations set forth in the complaint and 
answer to pay to the minor plaintiff the sum of $20.00 
monthly, that there would be no duty to pay any at-
torney's fees or court costs beyond those cost actually 
expended in filing the complaint which were less than 
$20.00. 
On July 22, 1963, immediately upon receiving the 
papers back from Germany, the plaintiff's counsel sent 
to the defendant a letter in the following words and 
figures: 
Mr. Dennis Cook 
Box 444 
Kaysville, Utah 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
July 22, 1963 
The papers finally arrived from Germany. We filed 
them today, and requested the Judge to sign an appropri-
ate order. Copies for your files are enclosed herewith. 
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After several inquiries, Miss Seuring did not want 
to consider the question of adoption. However, your 
consideration for the welfare of the child was appreci-
ated by all concerned. 
It appears that Miss Seuring was married to Wil-
helm Jungen on May 30th of this year. This will serve 
as added assurance that the child will be cared for. 
Payments of the agreed support should be made 
through this office. They have been set at $20.00 per 
month. You may determine for yourself what days of 
each month you wish to pay the same. As long as they 
arrive regularly, no one will bother you. 
If you have any question in the matter, please feel 
free to call upon me. 
JED:jl 
Enclosures 
Very truly yours, 
John Elwood Dennett 
The defendant's wife called shortly after July 22, 
1963, acknowledging receipt of the letter referred to, 
stating that the defendant was still unemployed and 
that they now lived at a new address, namely, 229 East 
2nd South, instead of Box 444, Kaysville, Utah. 
Plaintiff's counsel was asked if the defendant could 
have an additional month in which to commence regular 
$20.00 monthly payments and if the arrearage could 
be caught up at some future date. This was an agreeable 
arrangement. 
In connection with the papers that were returned 
from Germany, Miss Seuring indicated unequivocally 
that she was unwilling under any circumstances to con-
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sider any type of adoption arrangements. After a pe-
riod of time had elapsed and the defendant had not 
made the payments in accordance with his agreement, 
it appeared expedient to explore the defendant's cir-
cumstances and the reasons for non-payment of the 
agreed sum of support. An Order to Show Cause was 
sought of the court to bring the matter to some sort of 
speedy conclusion. 
The Honorable Judge Aldon J. Anderson signed an 
Order to Show Cause on the 29th day of January, 1964, 
ordering the defendant to be and appear before him on 
Monday, the lOth day of February, 1964, at the hour of 
10:30 a.m. to show cause, if any, why judgement should 
not be rendered against him for the arrearages of $300.00 
and the costs of court of $17.00 and why he should not be 
ordered to pay the sum of $20.00 per month for the sup-
port and maintenance of the plaintiff. 
At the time and place of the hearing as aforesaid, 
the defendant appeared together with Alfred Van Wag-
enen who without prior warning or notice, moved the 
court for an order of dismissal basing the argument some-
what upon the fact that the appearance and waiver and 
confession of liability in the form of an answer was not 
filed until after the return of the complaint from Ger-
many, during the pendency of which there was action 
pending. He more specifically argued that counsel's 
procedure involved here violated Canons 5 and 8 of the 
Code of Legal Ethics in that the answer which the de-
fendant had signed had been prepared for his signature 
by the plaintiff's counsel and that such proceedings were 
''inimical to the adversary proceedings prescribed by our 
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system of justice." 
The Court, upon hearing argument, seemed to brush 
aside the first proposition. Being apparently incensed 
over the fact that the answer which the defendant had 
signed was in fact typed for his signature by the plain-
tiff's counsel, the court directed one single question to 
the plaintiff's counsel to the effect "Mr. Dennett is it 
true that you prepared the Answer which the defendant 
signed which has been filed in this action?" To which 
plaintiff's counsel replied affirmatively. Whereupon, 
the court adopting the language of the argument of the 
defendant's counsel, said "I don't need to hear any more. 
This is inimical to adversary proceedings prescribed by 
our system of justice. The plaintiff's complaint is dis-
missed.'' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: There was nothing improper or irregular 
in the proceedings held or the conduct of counsel. 
A certain amount of mind reading would be helpful 
in trying to ascertain the acts and ommission of which 
the trial judge so strongly disapproved which motivated 
him to dismiss the complaint. The thoughts, feelings, 
and judgments of the trial judge must be inferred from 
his statement that the actions of plaintiff's counsel were 
"inimical to the adversary proceedings prescribed by our 
system of justice." 
This thinking apparently reflects the broad rule that 
attorneys shall not represent conflicting interests. 
This is obviously a good rule. Corpus Juris Secun-
dum states it this way: (Attorney and Client, Topic 47 
of Volume 7, Page 823) 
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"An attorney is by virtue of his office disqualified 
from representing interests which are adverse in 
the sense that they are hostile, antagonistic, or in 
conflict with each other.'' 
Common sense dictates that there can be no quarrel 
with such a proposition. This isn't the problem. It's a 
question simply of whether plaintiff's counsel's conduct 
constituted representation of the defendant; and even if 
it did, if the parties didn't consent thereto on full dis-
closure of the facts. It is further a question of whether 
the defendant has any standing to object thereto, and 
even if he did have, whether there exist any grounds for 
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint by reason thereof. 
The first question as to whether there was any rep-
resentation is a question of fact. On the second question 
(of consent and waiver), we read from Corpus Juris 
Secundum (Vol. 7, Attorney and Client, Page 826) 
"An attorney may properly represent adverse in-
terest where the persons represented expressly 
authorize him to do so or consent to the repre-
sentation. Or where notwithstanding the exist-
ance of conflicting interests, the parties concerned 
on full disclosure of the facts by the attorney's 
direct him to continue." 
This, of course, is the rule where there are conflict-
ing interests and where there is in fact a representation 
arrangement. The few minor helps offered to the de-
fendant in writing letters, obtaining visas, etc., hardly 
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seem hostile or adverse to the basic question of pater-
nity, about which there seemed to be no question at the 
time. 
Corpus Juris Secundum (Ibid. Page 825) says: 
"However, it is not inconsistent with the status or 
office of an attorney that he would represent dif-
ferent interests which are not actually adverse in 
the sense that they conflict or are hostile. The 
possibility that different interests represented by 
an attorney might develop a conflict does not suf-
ficiently disqualify him. Nor is an attorney to 
be disqualified merely by reason of conduct with 
respect to a party not amounting to impropriety 
under the circumstances of a particular case and 
where the parties represented by an attorney 
were actually benefited rather than adversely ef-
fected by attorney's conduct." 
On the question of the defendant's standing to object 
to the plaintiff's counsel's offer to help him in matters of 
visas, etc., while representing the plaintiff's paternity 
claim against him, Corpus Juris further states (Ibid. 
Page 826) 
"The objection that an attorney is disqualified by 
reason of his representing adverse interests is 
available only to those as to whom the attorney 
in question sustains the relationship of attorney 
and client." 
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Furthermore, if this court were to hold against the 
plaintiff on all of these issues, the only remedy is against 
the plaintiff's attorney for damages. The absence of 
any grounds for dismissal is treated. in the next section 
of this brief. Corpus Juris Secundum, Section 151, at 
Page 986, Volume 7 (headnote) says: 
"An attorney representing an adverse interest 
may be liable to one of the parties for loss due to 
the attorney's failure to disclose material facts." 
The text treatment of the headnote is as brief as the 
headnote itself: 
"In accordance with the Rule that attorneys are 
by virtue of their office disqualified from repre-
senting adverse interests in the sense that they 
are in conflict, an attorney who without the con-
sent of the interested party represents such ad-
verse interests may be liable for loss sustained by 
one of such parties due to the attorney's failure to 
disclose this material fact.'' 
This makes the issue here very simple: 
(a) Did the plaintiff's counsel ever represent the 
defendant? If so, what were the terms and scope 
of the employment? 
(b) If so, what payment or promise of payment 
was made for the services? 
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(c) Did the defendant consent to the plaintiff's 
counsel doing what he did? 
(d) Did the defendant have a full disclosure 
that the plaintiff's counsel was representing the 
plaintiff? 
(e) Are offers to help with foreign language 
problems, foreign correspondence, visas, pass-
ports, etc., hostile, antagonistic, in conflict or in-
compatable with obtaining a simple confession of 
liability of paternity? 
(f) What was the nature of the impropriety in-
volved in preparing for the defendant his confes-
sion of liability which he signed? 
(g) Did the defendant consent to being helped 
(represented is not the word)? 
(h) Does the defendant have any standing to ob-
ject to the representation? 
Statements in the defendant's affidavit which imply 
that plaintiff's counsel was representing the defendant 
are flatly belied by the defendant's testimony and may 
be disregarded. Also his statement to the effect that he 
was signing a confession of liability so that the matter 
could be later tried, tested, and fought, the result of 
which would have been exactly contrary to the liability 
which he confessed, stretches one's credulity too far, 
especially when done by a man of at least average in-
telligence who can read and write the English language 
and who is a sergeant in the United States Armed Forces. 
The offers to be helpful in writing letters to the ap-
propriate German authorities to the plaintiff with re-
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spect to the question of adoption were merely helpful 
gestures in view of the German language problem. Like-
wise, the offers to be helpful in the matter of passports 
and visas were friendly gestures which cannot be tor-
tured into being legal representation even by the most 
twisted views. The defendant never paid nor offered to 
pay the plaintiff's attorney for these gratuitous helps. 
Where is this relationship of attorney and client between 
the plaintiff's attorney and the defendant which seems 
to be causing so much consternation? 
Furthermore, the plaintiff would be the party hav-
ing grounds to object to this conduct; not the defendant. 
If the plaintiff were to have an objection that the plain-
tiff's counsel should not offer to be helpful to defendant 
in the writing of foreign language letters, obtaining pass-
ports and visas, and assisting in other matters relating 
thereto, it would be the prerogative of the plaintiff and 
not the defendant to object thereto. 
Were this court to uphold such a bizarre rule and 
all of its implications it would mean the following: 
1. That a plaintiff who represents a creditor and 
brings a suit upon a debt against a debtor could never 
accept payment, accept a promise of payment, agree upon 
an arrangement for payment, accept or prepare a promis-
sary note or prepare any instrument or evidence of in-
debtedness for the debtor to sign, a practice engaged 
in nearly every day by practicing attornies. 
Also an attorney representing parties in a divorce 
proceeding could not prepare an appearance and waiver 
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for the defendant to sign, a stipulation of property settle-
ment agreement, or an answer for the defendant without 
violating the rule against reresenting parties having an 
adverse interest. 
It would also mean that counsel representing the 
prospective adopting parents: Could not visit or talk 
with the natural mother, prepare the consent for adop-
tion, appear in court with the natural mother, or have 
any contact or conversation with the natural mother 
which, of course, would be abused under prevailing pro-
cedures. 
It is not urged that in this case any fine lines need 
be drawn to determine any respective rights of the par-
ties. It is simply a matter of applying common sense 
and good judgment to the facts and circumstances that 
exist in this case. 
POINT II. Even if the conduct of plaintiff's counsel 
were found to be improper, this is not grounds to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint. 
Grounds for involuntary dismissal are covered in 
Rules 12 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rules 12 (b) states that involuntary dismissal may 
be effected for: 
(1) Lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) 
lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, 
( 4) insufficiency of process, ( 5) insufficiency of service 
of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief 
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can be granted, and (7) failure to join an indispensible 
party. 
Rule 37 and other rules also provide that an action 
may be involuntarily dismissed for failure to obey a court 
order. 
If these stated grounds are by implication the only 
grounds for dismissal, there is no cause for dismissal in 
this case. 
Text authorities citing grounds of dismissal follow 
the same list of reasons as our Utah rules of civil pro-
cedure do. They are digested in our particular jurisdic-
tion under "Dismissal and Non-suit, Involuntary." Signi-
ficant sub-sections are as follows: 
46. Actions or proceedings which may be dis-
missed. 
49. Rights to dismissal or non-suit in general. 
52. Discretion of the court. 
53. Grounds 
( 1) In general 
(2) Vexations or fictitious suits 
(3) Stale demand 
( 4) Res judicata 
(5) Want of authority to bring suit 
55. Want of jurisdiction 
56. Defects and objections as to parties 
58. Defects and objections as to pleadings 
( 1) In general 
(2) Filing or service delayed or omitted 
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( 3) Insufficiency 
( 4) Variance 
81. Setting aside a reinstatement of cause. 
Researching the cases cited in the various sub-topics, 
the only conclusion that can be reached by this counsel 
is that there is no precedent, and are no cases in point, 
and no authority which would sustain an order of dismis-
sal under the facts of this case. The digest on many 
pertinent points simply makes reference to Corpus Juris 
Secundum, and American Jurisprudence, both of which 
give similar treatment to the subject of Dismissal and 
Non-suit. 
The numbers of the captions are slightly different in 
the text authorities. The subject is treated in Vol. 27, 
Dismissal and Non-Suit Topics 45 through 65. The in-
troduction states flatly that "a motion to dismiss suit 
should be founded on some defect apparent on the face 
record caused by the plaintiff's act or neglect and should 
not be based on matter of defense or matters relating to 
the merits." (Corpus Juris Secundum, Dismissal and 
Non-suit, Section 55, headnote.) 
The various grounds stated in the text authority are 
as follows: 
1. Moot or academic question 
2. Premature bringing of the action 
3. Vexations or fictitious suit 
4. Res Judicata 
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5. Pendency of another suit 
6. Want of authority to bring suit 
7. Error as to nature or form of remedy 
8. Misjoinder 
9. Disobedience of Order of Court 
10. Want of jurisdiction 
11. Irregularity of proceedings generally 
12. Delay in issue of service and return of process 
13. Want of capacity to sue 
14. Misnomer 
15. Non-joinder of parties 
16. Misjoinder of parties 
17. Death, disability or withdrawal of a party 
18. Variance in pleadings 
19. Want of prosecution 
This same list is covered with slightly different 
wording in American Jurisprudence. If the text authori-
ties can be presumed to have made a comprehensive, 
thorough, and exhaustive study and list of all possible 
grounds for granting a dismissal or non-suit, it is sub-
mitted that none of the foregoing grounds are present in 
the instant case. 
If the defendant was entitled to any remedy or re-
lief from his acts, it would perhaps be for leave to with-
draw his former answer and file an amended answer to 
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obtain relief from its effect if he can sustain the burden 
of proof that it was obtained under certain representa-
tions, duress, menace or undue influence. 
Under no circumstances can any authorities be 
found or cited which support the proposition that the 
facts and circumstances if the defendant's version of 
them were to be deemed to be true, would support an 
order of dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. 
The text authorities universally hold that dismissal 
is a harsh remedy and should not be invoked because of 
the reason of certain technicalities. Certainly the de-
privation of the plaintiff's right to be supported is too 
harsh for the facts brought to light in this case. An 
order of dismissal would adversely effect the life of an 
innocent infant for the next 21 years, punishment far 
too severe for an alleged indiscretion of his attorney 
whom he in fact has never met. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the procedures taken in the case 
involved were entirely proper in accordance with estab-
lished rules and procedures and were correct and cir-
cumspect in every respect. Even if this court should 
find the same not to be the case, an order of dismissal is 
an improper remedy and should not be invoked. If th~ 
defendant is entitled to any relief from his acts and om-
mission, the relief would have to be different than that 
relief granted by the trial court of dismissing the plain-
tiff's complaint against him. 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff is en-
titled to reinstatement of his cause of action, entry of 
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judgment for the monthly arrearages accruing after Oc-
tober 19, 1962, costs of court incurred in the District 
Court, and the costs of this Appeal. 
/s/ JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT, 
Attorney for Appellant 
1243 East 2100 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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